When did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century by Eric Hilt
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
WHEN DID OWNERSHIP SEPARATE FROM CONTROL? CORPORATE GOVERNANCE








I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Leah Boustan, Stanley Engerman, Carola Frydman,
Zorina Khan, Naomi Lamoreaux, Petra Moser, Antoinette Schoar, and seminar participants at UCLA,
Yale, Harvard, Columbia, UNC Chapel Hill, MIT Sloan, the NBER Summer Institute, the Economic
History Association annual meetings, and the Cliometrics Society conference.  Elira Kuka and Jaree
Pinthong provided superb research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2007 by Eric Hilt. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.When did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth
Century
Eric Hilt




This paper analyzes the ownership and governance of the business corporations of New York State
in the 1820s. Using a new dataset collected from the manuscript records of New York's 1823 capital
tax, and from the charters of the corporations, I analyze the ownership structures of the firms, and
investigate the degree to which ownership was separated from control at the time. In contrast to Berle
and Means's account of the development of the corporation, the results indicate that many of the firms
were dominated by large shareholders, who were represented on the firms' boards, and held sweeping
power to utilize the firms' resources for their own benefit.  The oppression of minority shareholders
was a significant problem in early corporate governance, and many of the firms configured their voting
rights in a way that curtailed the power of large investors. A positive relationship between firm value







ehilt@wellesley.eduWhen did the separation of ownership from control arise in American corporations? Was there
an early period in the development of the American economy in which ownership and control were
uni¯ed, and if so, how did the governance of these early corporations function? Such questions are
di±cult to answer, given the fragmentary nature of the records that survive from early businesses.
The most in°uential history of corporate ownership in the United States is presented in Berle and
Means's The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), which argues that legal, organiza-
tional and technological developments in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries eroded
the power and in°uence of stockholders, and led to the emergence of large, di®usely-held enterprises
controlled by professional managers, or by minority interests. In particular, Berle and Means claim
that in the early nineteenth century, ownership and control were indeed uni¯ed, and they distin-
guish the corporations of their time from those of a hundred years earlier, in which \the number
of shareholders was few; they could and did attend meetings; they were business-men; and their
vote meant something."1 Most of the subsequent literature on corporate governance has accepted
Berle and Means's characterization of the history of American corporations, and its emphasis on
developments in the late-nineteenth century leading to the separation of ownership from control
(see, for example, Dodd (1938) or Co®ee (2001))2.
But the early history of American corporations is not well understood. By the end of the
¯rst quarter of the nineteenth century, thousands of businesses in all manner of industries had
been granted corporate charters by American states, and especially beginning in the 1820s, a
small but growing number of these ¯rms had publicly-traded equity shares (Rousseau and Sylla,
2005)3. This era is generally regarded as a \statistical dark age," however, and although these
¯rms were certainly much smaller than the large industrial enterprises that appeared in the late-
nineteenth century, relatively little is known about their ownership or governance.4 With the
noteworthy exception of Werner (1986), who argues that control by management arose even in
the early-nineteenth century, the governance of America's early corporations has been the focus of
1Pg. 135 n. 14. The authors acknowledge the existence of textile corporations in Massachusetts with large
numbers of owners in the 1830s, but claim that these enterprises \stood alone" at the time (pg. 12).
2Roe (1994) and Becht and Delong (2005) complement the analysis of Berle and Means by examining additional
causes of the di®usion of American corporate ownership in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.
3The total number of business incorporations in the United States for any year after 1800 is not known, but the
data in Davis (1917), Evans, (1948) and Kessler (1948) indicate that well in excess of two thousand businesses were
chartered prior to 1826 in the large but incomplete group of states covered by those volumes.
4The ownership structures of extremely small numbers of early corporations in speci¯c industries, including textile
manufacturing (Davis, 1958), turnpike roads (Majewski, 1996), banks (Wright, 1999), and whaling (Hilt, 2006), have
been documented from the surviving records of individual ¯rms, but even these studies are unable to analyze the
governance of the ¯rms in any detail.
1little research. In view of the importance of the historical legal origins of contemporary investor
protections (see, for example, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998), this gap in
our understanding of early corporate governance is striking.
This paper analyzes the ownership and governance of a relatively large sample of early-nineteenth-
century ¯rms, using a newly-collected dataset of all of the business corporations chartered in New
York State through 1825. The main elements of the dataset were collected from the surviving
records generated by New York's capital tax of 1823-28, which required all operating business cor-
porations to submit a list of their stockholders to the state's comptroller. Many of these ownership
lists survive in the New York State Archives, and have been matched to the charters of the corpo-
rations; to lists of corporate directors obtained from contemporary newspapers and city directories,
and from surviving directors' minute books; and to price data of securities traded on the New York
Stock and Exchange Board (NYS&EB), the institution that would later change its name to the New
York Stock Exchange, collected by Sylla, Wilson and Wright (2005). The extensive information in
the dataset enables me to analyze the governance of the ¯rms in some detail.
In particular, I examine a series of questions relating to the extent of separation between own-
ership and control at the time. The ¯rst question is: what rights or protections were o®ered to
investors in these early corporations, and how did these rights in°uence the governance of the ¯rms?
Surprisingly, few of the ¯rms were required to produce regular ¯nancial statements, and there were
no ¯nancial reporting standards of any kind, beyond the common-law prohibition against fraud.
Mandatory dividend payments were also imposed only infrequently. The voting rights speci¯ed in
the charters were the most important means by which the stockholders could protect their inter-
ests, and the con¯gurations of voting rights chosen varied considerably. About half of the ¯rms
o®ered one vote per share to their stockholders, whereas most of the others o®ered what might
be termed \graduated" voting rights|the number of votes per share an investor was entitled to
was a (weakly) declining function of the number of shares he or she held.5 In order to analyze the
di®erent con¯gurations of votes speci¯ed in the charters I develop a simple index of shareholder
voting rights, and analyze how the average values of the index varied across across industries.
The second question I examine is: to what extent did large shareholders control these corpora-
tions? And what was the relationship between the extent of control by large shareholders, on the
one hand, and the governance institutions speci¯ed in the charters, on the other? Although the
5Davis (1917) documents the use of these measures in the earliest American corporations, and Dunlavy (2004)
describes the political rhetoric surrounding their use.
2data do indicate the presence of substantial numbers of small investors in many of the corporations,
in general, ownership was highly concentrated, and many ¯rms appeared to have been dominated
by large shareholders. As most large investors were represented on the ¯rms' boards, the extent
of managerial voting power was extremely high, with on average about 40% of the votes in the
hands of the directors. The oppression of minority investors by large shareholders was therefore a
central concern in the governance of these ¯rms, as with the ¯rms of the mid-nineteenth century
(Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, 2006). In general, ¯rms in the industries with the greatest ownership
concentration speci¯ed voting rights with the lowest values of the voting index, whereas ¯rms in
industries where share ownership was most equally distributed speci¯ed one vote per share, which
corresponds to the highest value of the index. This suggests that graduated voting rights were
chosen at least in part in order to attract small investors by limiting the voting power of large
shareholders.
The ¯nal question examined in the paper is: how did the protections of investors speci¯ed in
the charters, and the concentration of ownership of the shares, in°uence the market value of the
¯rms? Although securities price data from the period are perhaps less informative than those of
modern stock markets, as the trading volume was relatively light, the market values of the ¯rms
provide a means to assess the consequences of dominance by large shareholders, or governance
institutions designed to curtail that dominance, for the performance of the ¯rms. The results
indicate a positive correlation between ¯rm values and voting rights provisions that limited the
power of large shareholders, based on analysis of the within-industry variation. Moreover, a strong
negative correlation between the degree of managerial ownership and ¯rm value is found, which is
consistent with insiders expropriating the outside shareholders' property.
In general the results indicate that even in the early decades of the nineteenth century, before the
development of large industrial enterprises, and even before the emergence of railroads, there was
signi¯cant separation between ownership and control. Berle and Means's (1932, pg. 70) typology
of control structures is useful in characterizing the results: they distinguish between \(1) control
through almost complete ownership, (2) majority control, (3) control through legal device without
majority ownership, (4) minority control, and (5) management control," where each type represents
successively greater degrees of separation between ownership and control.6 Although few if any of
6Berle and Means document that 44% of the 200 largest ¯rms of their time were subject to management control
(1932, p. 115). Although their argument has become strongly identi¯ed with the consequences of management
control, even in their own sample the majority of ¯rms were not subject to this form of control. Recent research
has also shown that management control is not an accurate description of modern ¯rms in most contries (LaPorta,
3the ¯rms in the 1820s could be characterized as subject to management control, where ownership
is so di®use that no individual or group dominates the corporation through stock ownership, most
of the ¯rms in the dataset would have been characterized by Berle and Means as under minority
control|a group of investors held su±cient numbers of shares to dominate the ¯rm, because the
rest of the shares were di®usely held. The problems associated with this form of control were
much more acute in the 1820s than in later periods, however, because at the time there was little
if any distinction between control and management. Early corporations were in general run by
their directors|there were few hierarchical levels within the ¯rms.7 As there were few if any legal
constraints on self-dealing by directors at the time, an investor who controlled the management of
a ¯rm could easily harness its operations for his own bene¯t. Con°icts between large shareholders
(insiders) and small shareholders (outsiders) were therefore the central concern in early corporate
governance, and the protections o®ered to investors at the time were often designed to address
this problem. Overall, the picture of corporate governance in the early-nineteenth century that
develops is one of weak investor protections, and strong ownership concentration|a relationship
entirely consistent with that found in modern economies (La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny, 2000).
The sample of corporations analyzed in this paper encompasses a relatively large number of
enterprises in a broad range of industries, and represents the ¯rst systematic and consistent dataset
on early corporate governance. But it comes from only one state. American corporation law falls
mostly within the purview of state law, and the statutes and case law pertaining to corporations,
along with the content of corporate charters, di®ered somewhat across states.8 Nonetheless New
York's central role in the development of the American economy, and Wall Street's central role
in America's ¯nancial markets, makes New York's corporations an appropriate focus for a study
of corporate governance during this period. The early-nineteenth century was a period of rapid
growth and dynamism for New York's economy: the population of the state increased approximately
fourfold between 1790 and 1825, becoming the nation's most populous; the city of New York
developed into the preeminent center of business and ¯nance in the United States, surpassing
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999).
7On the history of management structures and their development, see Chandler (1977).
8Several works have analyzed the development of the corporation law in particular states, including Massachusetts
(Dodd, 1954), Maryland (Blandi, 1934), New Jersey (Cadman, 1949), and New York (Seavoy, 1982). Although none
of these works provides the detailed tabulations of charter provisions that would be necessary to make systematic
comparisons with the data presented in this paper, New York's corporation laws do not appear to be idiosyncratic
in any important sense.
4Philadelphia; and the completion of the Erie canal in 1825 further invigorated commerce in across
the state.9 Perhaps more importantly, New York was a great innovator in the area of corporation
law, and enacted one of the earliest general incorporation acts of any signi¯cance for businesses, the
1811 act for manufacturing companies; the ¯rst limited partnership law (1821) and one of the ¯rst
free banking laws (1838) in the United States; and several in°uential regulatory statues, such as the
safety fund law for banks (1829). Many of these statutes in°uenced the subsequent development
of corporation law in other states; in some cases entire New York statutes were copied wholesale.10
The next section of the paper presents an analysis of the voting rights con¯gurations speci¯ed
in early-nineteenth-century charters, and documents the governance institutions in the charters of
all New York business corporations from the years 1790-1825. Section 2 documents the ownership
structures of the corporations operating in 1826-27. Section 3 investigates the relationship between
the governance institutions chosen by the ¯rms, and their ownership structures. And section 4
presents an analysis of the relationship between the market values and the governance provisions
of the publicly-traded ¯rms in the sample. A detailed description of the sources and methods used
in constructing the dataset is provided in the Data Appendix at the end of the paper.
1 The Charters of New York's Corporations, 1790-1825
1.1 Historical Background
In the early-nineteenth century, the privileges of corporate status for businesses could only be ob-
tained by petitioning a state government for a charter, which would be granted by legislative act.
Although New York began to liberalize its incorporation process with its 1811 general incorporation
act for manufacturing companies, entrepreneurs in other industries still needed to obtain a special
act of the legislature in order to incorporate. The process of obtaining a charter was often costly
and time consuming, and the use of the corporate form was therefore con¯ned to industries where
incorporation was a legal requirement, as with banks, or where special corporate powers were cru-
cial, as with insurance ¯rms, some manufacturing ¯rms, and public utilities such as turnpike roads,
9New York's population grew from 340,120 in 1790 to 1,614,458 in 1825 (French, 1860). On the early prominence
of Philadelphia in American ¯nance, see Wright (2005), and Hammond (1957). For a discussion of the development
New York City's economy during this era, see, for example, Albion (1939), Myers (1931), and Miller (1962).
10For example, New Jersey adopted New York's 1811 general incorporation act for manufacturing companies with
very few changes in 1816, and considered, but ultimately rejected, adopting an act similar to New York's 1838 free
banking law in 1839 (Cadman 1949: pg. 21-27). Massachusetts adopted an act appointing commissioners for the
supervision and inspection of banks, similar to some of the provisions in New York's 1829 safety fund law (Dodd
1954: pg. 276).
5bridge companies, and gas light companies. Banks were among the most politically contentious
enterprises at the time, and banking charters were particularly di±cult to obtain.11
If granted, a charter of incorporation would specify the powers available to the ¯rm, the size of
the capital stock and the par value of the shares, and the duration of the corporation's existence.
The charters also included provisions that regulated the operations of the businesses, which varied
by industry|bank charters, for example, often included provisions that restricted the interest rates
that could be charged on loans, and limited their indebtedness; bridge and turnpike road company
charters dictated the rates of toll that could be charged; and manufacturing charters speci¯ed
the types of products the corporation was permitted to produce.12 In general, early corporations
did not have the power to merge with other corporations or in any way amend their charters
without seeking an additional legislative act. And in the years through 1825, none of New York's
corporations were granted the power to issue any securities other than common stock, and the right
to invest in the stock of other corporations was usually forbidden, except with insurance ¯rms.
The governance institutions of corporations were prescribed in their charters. Most corporations
were to be managed by an elected board of directors, who would, in turn, elect a president, and
also possibly appoint a secretary or treasurer, from among their members.13 The board would
usually have the authority, by majority rule, to write the corporation's by-laws, and generally run
the ¯rm.14 The charters sometimes also referred to salaried agents, cashiers, clerks, secretaries,
tellers, and others who would be hired by the directors and might have assumed some managerial
responsibilities. In general, however, most of the ¯rms in industries such as banking, insurance,
and bridges and turnpikes had very few employees,15 and although some of the manufacturing ¯rms
11See Hammond (1957) and Bodenhorn (2006). Many ¯rms resorted to obtaining banking powers through a back-
door route by ¯rst incorporating in a di®erent industry, and then lobbying to have banking privileges added to
their charter. Thus the New York Manufacturing Company became the Phoenix Bank, and the New York Chemical
Manufacturing Company became Chemical Bank. The Bank of the Manhattan Company was created by including
some vague and totally unrestrictive language about ¯nancial powers in the original 1799 charter of a water company.
12Many authors have ascribed particular importance to these limits imposed on the scope of the enterprise in early
charters, and to the ability of the state legislatures to \safeguard" shareholders by dictating the terms of charters.
See, for example, Berle and Means (1932, p. 131 and 134.) In a related and important work, Roe (1994) argues that
later regulations prohibiting banks and insurance companies from holding securities, motivated by populist politics,
prevented them from becoming powerful blockholders, and thus playing a more e®ective role in the governance of
non¯nancial corporations.
13For 15 of the corporations, mostly water companies, no board of directors was speci¯ed, although even for those
¯rms some kind of elected o±ce, such as a treasurer, was created.
14The directors' decision-making rules speci¯ed in the ¯rms' by-laws often had important implications for the ¯rms'
performance. For example, Meissner (2005) found that the voting rules governing loan approval in early banks had
signi¯cant e®ects on the rates of return earned by the banks' shareholders.
15For example, the directors' minutes of the Bank of America, the state's largest bank, indicate that in 1813 it
had only 13 salaried employees, including the president (Citigroup Archives, New York NY.) The directors' minutes
of turnpike road companies record entries where the directors themselves hire contractors to build the road, co-sign
loans on the ¯rm's behalf, and supervise the conduct of the gate keepers (Directors Minutes, Albany & Schenectady
6did have as many as 300 employees, the management of these enterprises probably had very few
hierarchical levels, and in many cases the directors supervised even the day-to-day operations of
the ¯rms.16
As in modern ¯rms, the stockholders' elective franchise was the principal mechanism by which
corporations were governed. For nearly all of the corporations in the sample, the charters required
elections of the entire board|there were no \classi¯ed" or staggered boards|to be held annually.17
As we will see, however, stockholders in early corporations enjoyed few other legal protections, and
were usually not even guaranteed the right to see annual ¯nancial statements.18 In the absence
of other safeguards, the election of directors assumed preeminent importance for the stockhold-
ers in defending their interests. And the conduct of the elections, including the voting rights of
stockholders, were often speci¯ed in great detail in the charters.
In what was likely an e®ort to control the power of large shareholders, the voting rights speci¯ed
in the charters often did not grant one vote per share, but instead granted a number of votes per
share that was a (weakly) decreasing function of the number of shares held. Attempts to control
the power of large shareholders in this way date back the earliest history of the business corporation
in England (see the examples in Scott, 1912), and some of the voting rights schemes adopted in
New York during this period resemble those devised hundreds of years earlier. The next section
presents a simple analysis of these voting rights schemes, and develops an index of voting rights to
be used in the empirical analysis that follows.
1.2 Voting rights of stockholders
Consider the charter for the Bank of New York, written by Alexander Hamilton. For the election
of directors, it speci¯es the following:
Turnpike Road, New-York Historical Society, New York NY.)
16An advertisement in the 1826 Longworth's New York City Directory for the Sterling Company, a manufacturer
of iron goods, boasts of having 350 employees; the 1832 Census of Manufactures lists at least one other ¯rm of that
scale in New York State, the Peru Iron Company. The director's minutes of manufacturing ¯rms often record the
directors deciding on the purchase of raw materials and equipment, hiring managerial employees and mechanics, and
supervising the sale of output (Directors' Minutes, Oneida Manufacturing Society, 1820-56, Oneida Historical Society,
Utica NY.) On the development of managerial systems and hierarchies in corporations, see Chandler (1977).
17The possible exception arises from the 1811 general incorporation act for manufacturing companies which did not
explicitly require annual elections of directors. Angell and Ames (1832), the ¯rst American treaties on corporation
law, argues that when the charter is silent on this issue, elections can be held \when the occasion requires it" (p. 66).
On staggered boards and ¯rm value in modern ¯rms, see Bebchuck and Cohen (2005).
18The shareholders in a corporation possessed a common-law right to see its books (Angell and Ames, 1832, p.
408), but this right was mostly likely costly or even impossible to enforce in some circumstances.
7each stockholder shall be entitled to a number of votes proportioned to the number
of shares which he or she shall have held in his or her own name...according to the
following ratio's [sic] that is to say, at the rate of one vote for each share not exceeding
four, ¯ve votes for six shares, six votes for eight shares, seven votes for ten shares, and
one vote for every ¯ve shares above ten.19
Such con¯gurations of voting rights, which might be termed \graduated voting rights" schemes,
granted one vote per share when small numbers of shares were held, but then after some threshold,
a shareholder was entitled to less than one vote per share. Some were simpler than that of the
Bank of New York; most turnpike corporations, for example, allowed one vote per share for up to
10 shares, and then one vote for every ¯ve additional shares held. Other versions added a maximum
number of votes for any stockholder. But in every case we can think of the charter as specifying a
function, v(n), which determines the number of votes to which an investor holding n shares would
be entitled. For enterprises that chose one vote per share, v(n) = n, but in the charters of many
corporations like the Bank of New York, for values of n above some threshold, v(n) < n.
The graduated voting rights granted to stockholders in some early-nineteenth-century corpora-
tions were somewhat more complex than the allocations of votes considered in the modern theoret-
ical literature on voting rights (see, for example, Harris and Raviv (1988) and Grossman and Hart
(1988)), because they caused the relative voting power of each shareholder to become an endoge-
nous function of the entire distribution of the shares. In particular, the power of large shareholders
was diminished by these schemes only when small shareholders were also present. For a ¯rm with
stockholders who each hold equal stakes, whether they are large or small, graduated voting rights
will produce exactly the same relative voting power for each stockholder as one vote per share: the
nominal number of votes for each shareholder will be reduced, but each investor's share of the total
votes will be the same. Only in the presence of small shareholders, who might receive as much as
a full vote per share, is the voting power of large investors diminished. This implies that impact of
graduated voting rights can only be assessed once the distribution of share ownership is known.
We can, however, construct an index of the potential of a given voting rights con¯guration to
reduce the power of large shareholders. A simple way to motivate this index is to plot a typical
v(n) function|that is, a function specifying the number of votes a stockholder is entitled to when
n shares are held|and also votes per share, or
v(n)
n , for increasing values of n. Figure 1 plots
v(n) and
v(n)
n for two ¯rms, one with one vote per share, labelled v1(n), and one with a graduated
19New York Laws, 1791, ch. 37. This is similar to Hamilton's scheme for the voting rights of stockholders in his
proposal for a \National Bank," in which he also o®ers an extended analysis and justi¯cation of these schemes. See
Davis (1917, p. 324).
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voting rights scheme, v2(n). Both ¯rms are assumed to have a total of N shares. The v2(n) function
plotted is that employed in most turnpike road companies, and was the most common graduated
voting rights scheme chosen. As panel (a) illustrates, with the graduated voting rights scheme, the
slope of the line representing the number of votes a shareholder is entitled to becomes much °atter
than the line representing one vote per share once a fairly low threshold of holdings is reached. As
panel (b) of the ¯gure makes clear, for a holder of a large block of shares, the number of votes
per share could be substantially reduced by these schemes. In the presence of many shareholders
holding small enough stakes so that they received a full vote for each share they held, the relative
power of a large shareholder would be substantially reduced by this scheme.
In panel (b), the area below the
v2(n)
n line, denoted (B), will be increasing in the number of
votes to which holders of large stakes are entitled. This suggests that the relative fraction of the
total area in the ¯gure taken up by (B), or
(B)
(A)+(B), could serve as an index of the potential voting









The index can assume any value between 0 and 1, and can be thought of as measuring the voting
scheme's potential to reduce the power of large shareholders; low values of the index signify poten-
tially substantial reductions in relative votes in the presence of small shareholders. Corporations
choosing voting rights with a low value of this index e®ectively grant more cash °ow rights than
9voting rights to large shareholders, and more voting rights than cash-°ow rights to small share-
holders. Thus these measures have the opposite e®ect of the \control-enhancing mechanisms" of
founding families identi¯ed in some modern corporations (see, for example, Villalonga and Amit,
2006; and LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999).
A corporation choosing a voting rights scheme with a low value of the index creates an obvious
incentive for investors to hold their shares in many names other than their own, in order wield a
larger number of votes. Although such behavior was documented among the shareholders of the
Second Bank of the United States|the privately-owned, quasi-central bank charted by the federal
government in 1816, which had a graduated voting rights scheme that was extremely punitive
towards large shareholders (Hammond, 1957)|the extent to which large shareholders circumvented
the voting rights con¯gurations of other business corporations in this way is not known, and will
be investigated in the empirical analysis below.
Also, to the extent that these measures were not circumvented, their e®ect on the quality of
management chosen, or ¯rm value, is potentially ambiguous. On the one hand, they clearly limit the
power of large shareholders, and if the expropriation of outside shareholders by insiders who held
large stakes was a common problem, then voting rights that tipped the balance of power toward
small shareholders might have raised the value of the ¯rm. On the other hand, such measures
would insulate the ¯rm from the forces generated by the market for corporate control, and in
particular would make it quite di±cult for a large investor to purchase a controlling stake in the
¯rm. The relationship between the choice of voting rights con¯guration and ¯rm value will also be
investigated in the empirical analysis below.
1.3 Governance provisions in the charters
From 1790 to 1825, New York State granted charters of incorporation to 812 businesses. The spec-
i¯cations of voting rights in the charters, along with other governance provisions, are summarized
in table 1. As indicated in the table, in about 80% of the charters, the right to vote by proxy in the
election of directors was guaranteed.20 At the time, proxy votes (like all votes) were cast in person,
so a shareholder wishing to vote by proxy would send another individual in his or her stead.
The charters sometimes also contained other provisions regulating the composition or the actions
20New York's courts later held that the right to vote by proxy could only be granted in a charter (Philips v.
Wickham, 1 Paige 590 New York (1829)). Prior to this decision in 1829, the rights of shareholders with respect
to proxy voting, when it was granted by a ¯rm's bylaws rather than its charter, were uncertain. Dodd (1954), for
example, mentions that the Connecticut courts held in 1812 that bylaws that permitted proxy voting were valid.
10Table 1:
Charter Governance Provisions: Industry Means, 1790-1825
Mean values of selected governance provisions for all 812 business corporations chartered in New York, 1790-1825, and by
industry. The industry category Banks encompasses all institutions permitted to issue banknotes, and therefore includes ¯rms
that have a fraction of their capital invested in other industries. The insurance and ¯nance companies include all insurance
companies, along with the ¯ve loan or \lombard" companies that were permitted to make collateralized loans, but were forbidden
from issuing banknotes. As insurance companies were also permitted to issue loans, in practice these institutions were quite
similar. The category All Others includes 28 water companies, 18 canals, 4 mutual savings banks, a hotel, 15 steamboat or
ferry companies, 2 trading companies, 4 gas light companies, a ¯nancial exchange, and 11 mining companies.
All Charters, Insurance Manu- All
1790-1825 Banks Bridges & Finance facturing Turnpikes Others
(N = 812) (N = 43) (N = 86) (N = 74) (N = 221) (N = 304) (N = 84)
Election of Directors
Voting by proxy guaranteed .82 1 .21 .97 .97 .89 .56
Voting rights categories:
One vote/share .48 .63 .55 .93 .91 .01 .53
Graduated voting rights .45 .26 .41 .03 .02 .98 .23
One vote/shareholder .02 0 .01 .01 0 0 .18
Not speci¯ed .05 .12 .03 .03 .07 .02 .07
Index of voting rights (Vi) .63 .74 .70 .96 .99 .23 .76
Actions Required of the Board
Mandatory dividends .40 0 .20 0 0 .98 .13
Annual ¯nancial statements .14 .40 .23 .41 .13 .01 .18
Composition of the Board
Number on board 9 13 6 20 5 8 8
Local residency requirement .04 .35 .01 .05 .01 .01 .10
Shareholding requirement .78 .93 .88 .90 .46 .99 .61
of the board. For example, the directors were usually (78% of the time) required to own stock in
the ¯rm, and more rarely (4% of the time) imposed a speci¯c local residency requirement for some
or all of the directors. About 40% of the ¯rms' boards were required to pay out all pro¯ts out as
dividends, leaving no discretion over retaining earnings.21 And ¯nally, 14% of the charters required
the management of the ¯rm to produce annual ¯nancial statements, either at the shareholders'
annual meeting, or in a ¯ling to the state government.22
The voting rights of the shareholders were generally speci¯ed in precise detail in the charters.
In 48% of them, each share was entitled to one vote, irrespective of the number of shares held. For
46% of the charters, a \graduated" voting rights system was speci¯ed. For 2% of the ¯rms, each
shareholder was granted one vote, and, ¯nally, for 4.7% of the ¯rms, the votes of shares were not
speci¯ed at all. In the latter case, with no guarantee of voting rights for the shares in the charter,
most corporations likely speci¯ed the voting rules for shareholders in their bylaws; indeed, at least
21For another 32% of the ¯rms, their charter stated that it \shall be the duty" of the directors to pay dividends
out of the ¯rms' earnings, but the directors were given total discretion over the amount.
22Another 0.4% of the ¯rms were required to produce ¯nancial statements every three years, and 38% of the
¯rms, mostly the turnpike road companies, were required to produce a single set of ¯nancial statements once they
commenced operations, and then never again.
11one charter from the era speci¯ed parameters within which the voting rights chosen in the bylaws
must fall.23 For all the ¯rms in the sample where the voting rights of stockholders were speci¯ed,
the average value of the voting rights index Vi is .63.
We can begin to understand the intentions behind the governance provisions in the charters by
comparing those selected in di®erent industries, as in the further columns of table 1, where summary
statistics are presented for six broad industry categories. The columns in the table indicate that
there was substantial variation across industries in the style of governance institutions chosen.24
Manufacturing corporations, for example, almost always granted their investors one vote per share,
only rarely required annual ¯nancial statements, and never mandated that all pro¯ts had to be paid
out as dividends. Manufacturing ¯rms also had the smallest boards, and imposed the requirement
of share ownership by directors with the lowest frequency. As we will see below, these governance
provisions re°ected an ownership structure that was quite di®erent than that commonly found in
other industries.
In contrast, banks and insurance companies, whose ¯nancial powers created ample opportunities
to defraud investors and creditors, and to disrupt the payments system, were the only ¯rms whose
charters mandated annual ¯nancial statements with any regularity, and even in these industries
the requirement was imposed only 40% of the time. Firms in these two industries had very large
boards, and the directors were never required to pay out all pro¯ts as dividends. The one important
di®erence between the charters in banking and insurance is in their voting rights: whereas the
average value of the index of voting rights for insurance ¯rms is .96, in banking it is .74, re°ecting
the use of some graduated voting rights schemes.
In turnpike road companies, and to a lesser extent in bridge companies, graduated voting rights
were heavily used, as was the requirement of mandatory dividend payments of all pro¯ts.25 Overall
the lowest values of the voting index (re°ecting voting rights con¯gurations with the greatest
potential to reduce the power or large shareholders) were found in turnpikes, bridges, and banks.
One might imagine that the charters of ¯rms in these industries were designed to attract the
23Laws of New York, 1826, Ch. 202. New Jersey's supreme court later held that bylaws could not override a
common law rule of one vote per person when a charter did not specify voting rights (Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.J.L.
222 (Sup. Ct. 1834)). Ratner (1970), however, argues persuasively that the common law actually had no clear rule
with respect to stockholders' voting rights. Moreover, Angell and Ames (1832, p. 64) point to cases that held that
corporations were free to regulate their election in bylaws when the charter was silent on the issue.
24Gillan, Hartzell and Starks's (2006) analysis of a large sample of modern ¯rms identi¯es somewhat similar
clustering in ¯rms' choices of governance mechanisms, although they do not link the clusters to the ¯rms' industries.
25In the case of turnpikes, these outcomes re°ect the requirements imposed by the 1807 general regulating act for
that industry; all turnpike companies chartered after 1807 had these provisions imposed on them by the act.
12participation of small shareholders by o®ering them some measure of protection from dominance by
large shareholders. Alternatively, the legislature may have regarded the control of these enterprises,
and in particular the potential for large shareholders to abuse that control, as a matter of public
concern: the route of a turnpike road, the placement of a bridge, and of course the notes or loans
issued by a bank all might have created opportunities for private gain by a dominant shareholder
at the expense of small investors, or the community, in a way that was far less likely to be true of
¯rms in industries such as manufacturing.
1.4 Other Governance Statutes
The rights of shareholders expressed in the charters were to a limited extent supplemented by statute
laws enacted during the period, but in general the rapid proliferation and increasing sophistication
of corporations outpaced the e®orts of the legislature and the courts to protect the interests of
investors. There were, for example, still relatively few statutes governing the behavior of corporate
directors. Moreover, the notion that a corporate charter was a contract between the state and
the ¯rm that could not be impaired, as held by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1819 Dartmouth
College decision, made it di±cult for the state to impose measures such as a ¯nancial reporting or
inspection requirement on institutions whose charter did not already include such a provision.
The ability of the state to enforce its statutes was also limited, as the state government had
only skeletal administrative o±ces. For example, many insurance companies, in violation of the
state's restraining statutes and also in violation of their charters, issued bonds or notes designed to
circulate as bank notes, o®ered discount loans, and generally assumed the powers of banks.26 Even
after the restraining statutes were strengthened, and subsequent court decisions removed any doubt
regarding the legality of these actions, the New York Senate's ¯nance committee found in 1825 that
these practices remained fairly widespread.27 Even on matters that were simpler to monitor, such
as the use of the general incorporation statute, the limits of the law with respect to the industries
within which the ¯rms had to operate were violated, with little apparent consequence.28 And in
other cases, safeguards or regulations were circumvented. Most charters of ¯nancial companies, for
example, included a requirement that a minimum amount of capital be paid in before the business
26See New York Firemen Insurance Company v. Ely, 2 Cow 678 New York (1824), for details of one prominent
episode.
27Albany Argus, 19 April 1825.
28The statute permitted ¯rms to incorporate in the production of very speci¯c categories of textiles, metals, and
glass. And yet the \Farmers Brewery" was incorporated in Brooklyn in 1817 (Records of the state comptroller, New
York State Archives.)
13could commence operations. These regulations seemed to presume that the payments would be
made in specie, but instead such payments were nearly always made notes of various kinds, or
pledged securities.29
Notwithstanding these limitations, the state did enact a highly signi¯cant piece of legislation
in 1825 to protect the rights of shareholders and creditors. The act required that dividends could
only be paid out of ¯rms' pro¯ts; limited the indebtedness (relative to paid-in capital) that any
¯rm could take on, and made directors personally liable for any indebtedness in excess of this
amount; and imposed rules on the conduct of the election of directors, such as the requirement
that the stock transfer books (which list the shareholders eligible to vote in elections of directors)
be open to inspection.30 In response, a substantial body of case law relating to the election of
directors began to develop, as the courts interpreted this law in the context of di®erent practices
employed by insiders seeking to disenfranchise other shareholders.31 In the following years, the
state's regulations of corporations became more sophisticated, ¯rst in the Revised Statutes of 1828,
which strengthened and expanded the 1825 law, and later with the introduction of the safety fund
law for banks in 1829.
In many respects, the rights of shareholders in early-nineteenth-century New York were rela-
tively weak: many fraudulent practices in the elections of directors where not made illegal until the
statute of 1825, and even then, the impact of the law took time to evolve; most corporations were
not obligated to present their investors with ¯nancial statements; and the state struggled to rein in
corporations that violated even the most politically sensitive laws, such as those regulating entry
into banking. Directors of ¯nancial corporations routinely \hypothecated" their shares, meaning
that they used their shares as collateral to borrow from the company and were often its debtors,
rather than investors.32 The shares of many banks and insurance companies were traded on the
New York Stock and Exchange Board, but the exchange itself had no listing requirements at the
time, and did not provide meaningful safeguards for investors. Nonetheless, many corporations
29See the discussion in Hammond (1957). The descriptions of the ¯nancial transactions of some companies that
went bankrupt in the New York Evening Post of 22 December 1826 mentions ¯rms where none of the payments were
made in specie.
30Other provisions of the law included many speci¯c regulations of banks, and penalties for violating the terms of
the charter. Laws of New York, 1825, ch. 325.
31Among such practices that the courts took up were directors attempting to use pledged shares to vote (Ex parte
Willcocks 7 Cow 402 New York (1827)) using shares for which they were only trustees to vote (Ex parte Holmes
5 Cow 426 New York (Sup Ct 1826)), and using treasury shares to vote (Ex parte Desdoity 1 Wend 98 New York
(1828)). These practices will be discussed below.
32See Lamoreaux (1994), and also Hammond (1957), who points out that even the investment of the federal
government in the Bank of the United States was immediately hypothecated.
14created during the period successfully attracted investments from large numbers of shareholders.
In the next section, I describe the data collected from the records of New York State's capital
tax, which will be used to analyze the ownership of these corporations.
2 New York's Corporations in 1826-27 and Their Ownership
In 1823, the New York legislature passed a law that exempted individuals' stock holdings from
taxation, and instead levied a tax on the paid-in capital of incorporated companies, payable by
the corporations themselves. The comptroller's ledgers of corporations, shareholdings, and tax
payments, along with the stockholder lists submitted by many corporations, survive in the New
York State Archives.
Of the 812 companies granted charters in New York in 1825 or before, the comptroller's o±ce
found that only 282 were in operation in 1826 or 1827.33 Table 2 presents the industries, reported
paid-in capital, and location of the operating ¯rms. In total, the capital of all operating corporations
was about $48 million, and the state's 95 banks and insurance companies accounted for about $39
million or 81% of that total. There were 67 manufacturing ¯rms, 63 turnpikes, 36 bridges, and small
numbers of ¯rms in other industries such as gas lighting, steamboats, and water works. The data in
the table indicate that there was signi¯cant variation in the average sizes of the corporations across
industries, with the largest companies in banking and ¯nance, and the manufacturing corporations
and turnpikes and bridges much smaller.
Turning to the lower panel of the table, of these 282 corporations, 74 (26%) were located in New
York City, and they had total capital of $34 million, or about 71% of all corporations' capital|
a consequence of the fact that most of New York City's ¯rms were large banks and insurance
companies. In general, the remaining counties with signi¯cant numbers of corporations were located
either along the Hudson river, or in the counties in the central part of the state touched by the
Erie Canal, such as Oneida.
2.1 Ownership
For 132 of the 282 operating corporations, the complete list of their shareholders was found for
at least one year, and for 246, the geographical distribution of their shares aggregated by county
33The comptroller's records include many ¯rms that ¯led reports in 1826 and not 1827, and vice versa. Although
in a few of the former cases it is clear that the ¯rms went bankrupt in 1826, in most such cases the comptroller's
o±ce did not know the reason for the missing report. Therefore all companies that ¯led in either year are included.
15Table 2:
New York Business Corporations in Operation in 1826 or 1827:
Industrial Composition, Location, and Paid-In Captial
Firms determined by the New York comptroller to have been in operation in 1826 or 1827, and their paid-in capital, by industry
and by county. Total charters granted is the number of charters granted in New York from 1790-1825. The percentage of ¯rms
in operation is the number of ¯rms in operation divided by the number of charters granted. Hudson River Valley Counties
includes Albany, Rensselaer, Greene, Columbia, Ulster, Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, and Westchester.
Total Total % of Operating ¯rms:
Charters Operating Firms in Avg. Total
Granted Firms Operation Capital Capital
All Firms 812 282 .35 169,687 47,851,576
Industrial Composition
Banks 43 41 .95 505,835 20,739,240
Bridge Companies 86 36 .42 11,480 413,288
Insurance & Related Finance 74 54 .73 343,058 18,525,168
Manufacturing Companies 221 67 .30 57,405 3,846,168
Turnpikes 304 63 .21 34,187 2,173,924
All Others 84 21 .25 103,520 2,153,790
Location
New York City 121 74 .61 462,048 34,191,572
Hudson River Valley Counties 210 69 .33 72,092 6,560,395
Oneida County 52 22 .42 85,718 1,885,792
Brooklyn (Kings County) 12 9 .75 73,778 664,000
All Other Counties 417 114 .27 52,905 4,549,818
was found. Most of the stockholder lists are for the year 1826, although a small handful are from
other years. In that year, the equity of 63 ¯rms was traded on the New York Stock and Exchange
Board; all but one of these publicly-traded ¯rms operated in New York City (with one in Brooklyn),
and all but four were banks and insurance companies.34 This market almost certainly facilitated
substantially greater di®usion of the shares of the listed companies.
Some summary statistics of these data are presented in table 3. There was an enormous degree
of variation in ownership structures across ¯rms. The number of owners ranged from 560 (Bank
of America, capital $2 million) to just 3 (Athens Turnpike Company, capital $8,000). On average,
the corporations had about 74 shareholders, which implies that at least some small stakes were
commonly held. The surnames of the shareholders reveal that kinship ties may have been important
in the allocation of shares; for 26% of investors in each corporation, there was another investor in
that corporation with the same surname. The average ¯rm's equity was owned in 5 counties, with
34% owned in New York City, and 10% owned outside of New York State. Certainly a fair number
of shareholders lived far away from the businesses in which they invested, and very likely had no
contact with or involvement in their day-to-day operations.
Looking across the di®erent industries, those with the largest ¯rms, such as banks and insurance,
34The remaining companies included two mining companies, a water company, and a gas light company.
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Ownership Structure: Industry Means
Means of measures of ownership structure for all operating ¯rms where data could be obtained, by industry. The percentage
of shareholders with a surname in common measures the percentage of shareholders for whom there is another shareholder in
the same corporation with the same surname. Measures of cash °ow rights are based on the distribution of the corporations'
shares, but measures of the distribution of voting rights are calculated by applying the voting rights speci¯ed in the corporate
charters to the distribution of shares.
All Insurance Manu- All
Firms Banks Bridges & Finance facturing Turnpikes Others
Shareholders (N = 132)
Total number of shareholders 74 252 59 132 17 69 59
% of shareholders w/surname in common .26 .33 .27 .24 .27 .30 .22
% held by other corporations .04 .15 0 .07 .01 0 .08
Concentration of Ownership (N = 132)
% held by top 10% of shareholders:
Cash °ow rights .48 .61 .49 .46 .42 .54 .55
Voting rights .44 .55 .45 .44 .42 .37 .50
Gini coe±cient
Cash °ow rights .57 .71 .55 .59 .47 .62 .67
Voting rights .52 .64 .50 .57 .46 .45 .65
Geographical Distribution (N = 246)
Number of counties in which stock held 5 8 3 5 3 5 4
% of stock held in New York City .34 .37 .08 .76 .23 .12 .44
% of stock held outside New York State .10 .16 .08 .10 .07 .09 .08
had the largest numbers of shareholders, and their ownership was also the most geographically
dispersed. The wide ownership of banks and insurance companies was probably also due in part to
the appeal of the equity of these often consistently-pro¯table ¯rms to a broad range of investors, who
could trade shares in these companies through brokers on the stock exchange in New York City.
Moreover, ¯rm size clearly was not the only determinant of ownership di®usion: manufacturing
¯rms, which were on average much larger than either turnpike companies or bridge companies, had
by far the smallest numbers of shareholders. Almost all of the manufacturing enterprises in the
dataset could be considered \close corporations," with very illiquid shares that traded only rarely,
held in large blocks by local investors.35
The table also includes two measures of the degree of concentration of ownership: the total frac-
tion held by the top 10% of investors, and also the Gini coe±cient of shareholdings. These measures
are presented both for cash °ow rights (percentage of the shares held) and voting rights, calculated
from the entire distribution of shareholdings according to the voting con¯guration speci¯ed in the
charter. On average, most ¯rms had a few very large shareholders, with the top 10% holding 48%
of the shares. The ¯rms with the most equally distributed shares were in manufacturing, and
35The surviving stock ledgers of manufacturing companies record relatively few transactions. For example, the
Whitestown Cotton and Wollen Manufacturing Company had 15 shareholders in the mid-1820s, and from the inception
of the ¯rm in 1812 until the end of the ledger in 1827, a total of 34 people held shares at some time. Many of the
transfers that did occur were between family members (Stock Ledger, Oneida County Historical Society, Utica NY.)
17the most unequally distributed were in banking, turnpikes, and some of the ¯rms included in the
\other" category. The e®ect of the voting rights con¯gurations chosen in the di®erent industries on
the power of large shareholders can be seen by comparing the measures of inequality in cash °ow
rights with those of voting rights. In nearly all industries except manufacturing, where one vote
per share was nearly always chosen, the voting rights of large shareholders was curtailed at least
somewhat. In particular, in banks and turnpikes, the voting rights con¯gurations chosen reduced
the power of large shareholders substantially. This ¯nding implies that many investors were willing
to hold stakes in ¯rms well in excess of the voting rights they would be granted. Even if they did
circumvent the e®ects of the ¯rms' voting rights by holding shares in more than one name, they
apparently did not do so enough to ensure that their voting power was undiminished.
2.2 Managerial Ownership and Corporate Control
A crucial element in understanding the ownership structure of these ¯rms, and the extent of sep-
aration between ownership and control, is the degree of managerial ownership. Unfortunately, the
lists of shareholders submitted pursuant to New York's capital tax did not identify the directors of
the ¯rms, and were simply signed by the corporate secretary or president. An extensive search of
contemporary newspapers and city directories was therefore undertaken, and eventually the lists of
directors for 51 of the corporations were obtained, and matched to a shareholder list.36 The corpo-
rations for which a directors list could be found through this approach were overwhelmingly located
in New York City (43 of 51 ¯rms), and tended to be institutions of a \public" character, such as
insurance companies, banks, and large manufacturing companies. If the relationship between ¯rm
size and managerial ownership of the twentieth century holds for this period, then the extent of
managerial ownership in the large ¯rms for which directors lists could be found is probably close
to a lower bound for overall managerial ownership.37
Moreover, unlike the proxy statements of modern public ¯rms, where the shares \bene¯cially
owned" or controlled by management are precisely enumerated, the shareholder lists from the
1820s do not identify shares that a director might have controlled or voted, but that he did not
own directly. For example, some contemporary accounts mention the practice of shareholders
36Many corporations at the time listed their directors in advertisements or solicitations, and the results of elections
of directors were sometimes reported in newspapers. These ¯ndings were supplemented with a few lists of directors
obtained from the minute books of directors' meetings held in various archives. See the Data Appendix.
37The extent of managerial ownership, and the relationship between ownership and ¯rm size, is documented in
Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999).
18\giving their proxies to o±cers of banks," or essentially delegating their votes to the management
itself.38 There is no way to know how common such voting agreements were, as no such agreements
were identi¯ed on the shareholder lists. Similarly, some corporations, particularly insurance ¯rms,
held relatively large stakes in other corporations, and it was often the case that a director of the
insurance ¯rm was also a director of the corporation in which the insurance ¯rm held a stake. In
compiling the directors' shareholdings, I assumed that the shares owned by any corporations in
which a shareholder was a director would be voted by that shareholder.
Often the lists of stockholders included trusts, where one or more of the directors were trustees.
Consistent with the treatment of shares owned by corporations, and with contemporary accounts,
I assumed that the directors would vote those shares. However, in many cases these shares were
actually treasury shares or shares forfeited by investors who never paid in the amounts they sub-
scribed for. In principle, these shares should not have entitled their trustees to any votes. And yet
the contemporary case law indicates that the shares in such trusts, which often constituted large
or even majority blocks of shares, were voted by the directors of the ¯rm.39 Consider the example
of the Tradesmen's Insurance Company. At its founding in 1825, a group of seven investors, one
of whom was the president of a New Jersey bank, subscribed to a majority of the shares. This
acquisition was ¯nanced through a \stock note" issued by the bank: the bank took the shares as
collateral, and the company was given deposit credit at the bank equal to that amount. When
some of the other bank directors objected to the transaction and refused to accept checks drawn
by the Insurance Company on its account, the transaction was eventually reversed, and the shares
were returned to the company. But rather than acknowledging that the shares had e®ectively never
been paid in, the directors placed the shares in a trust, with the president of the company and
two other directors as trustees. As the nominal owners of the stock, they voted the shares.40 And
because the shares in the trust accounted for 1,582 of the company's 4,000 total shares, the votes of
these shares, when added to those of the shares owned directly by the board (511), gave them 52%
of the votes of the ¯rm (the ¯rm's charter speci¯ed that each share was entitled to one vote). In
most cases, however, it is not possible to observe whether the directors actually voted those shares,
38New York Daily Advertiser, 4 June 1819.
39In some cases the shares were not held within a trust, but were instead held in the name of the president of the
company, or the company itself. For example, the 1826 stockholder list for the United States Fire Insurance Company
lists John L. Bowne, its president, as the owner of 189 shares, but then also lists \John L. Bowne, President" as
owner of 966 shares. (New York State Archives, Albany NY.)
40These votes were later held to be illegal (Ex parte Holmes 5 Cow 426 New York (Sup Ct 1826)), but this practice
seems not to have been unusual.
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Managerial Voting Rights: Industry Means
Means of measures of managerial ownership for all operating ¯rms where data could be obtained, by industry. The total number
of ¯rms for which data on managerial ownership could be obtained was 51. Total managerial cash °ow rights includes shares
held directly and indirectly by the members of the board. Shares held indirectly includes shares held in trust, shares held by
another corporation in which a board member is also a director, shares held by a partnership in which a director is a member,
and shares held in the name of the president of the company or the company itself. The voting stake of outside 5% blockholders
is the total percentage of the votes to which all holders of 5% or more of the shares who are not on the board are entitled,
given the voting rights speci¯ed in the charter. The margin of managerial control is the di®erence between the voting rights of
management, and the voting stake of outside 5% blockholders.
All Insurance & Manu- All
Firms Banks Finance facturing Turnpikes Others
Total managerial cash °ow rights .42 .20 .39 .64 .28 .47
Shares held directly .28 .11 .22 .63 .27 .21
Shares held indirectly .14 .08 .17 .01 .01 .26
Total managerial voting rights .39 .18 .38 .57 .19 .40
Voting stake of outside 5% blockholders .07 .09 .04 .21 .05 .02
Margin of managerial control .32 .10 .34 .36 .14 .38
so there is a danger that the managerial ownership data presented below may overstate the stake
held by the directors somewhat, if they in fact did not vote shares held in this way.
With these caveats in mind, the data for managerial ownership are presented in table 4. The
data indicate that on average, ownership by the directors was extremely high, with 28% of the
shares held directly, and 14% held indirectly, either through corporations, partnerships or trusts,
for a total ownership stake of 42%. Given the ¯rms' voting rights con¯gurations, these stakes
entitled the directors on average to 39% of the total votes of their ¯rms. Compared to mean
ownership of about 13% and 21% for American public corporations in 1935 and 1995, respectively
(Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan, 1999), the extent of managerial shareholding in the 1820s was
much higher. The levels of management ownership during the period are similar to those of modern
¯rms in the ¯rst year after their IPO, which is about 38% (Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz, 2007).
In order to assess the relative power of management's voting stake, the percentage of all of the
votes controlled by holders of 5% or more of the stock who were not on the board was also calculated.
As these large blockholders had the greatest incentive to monitor the performance of management,
and to vote their shares, they were the mostly likely check on management's power. On average,
these blockholders controlled 7% of the ¯rms' votes, meaning that the margin of managerial control
was 32%. Many of the ¯rms might have been characterized by Berle and Means as under minority
control, as the stake held by insiders was large enough to be unchecked by any outside investors.
The data presented in table 4 also indicate that there was substantial variation across industries
20in the degree of managerial ownership in the ¯rms. The directors of manufacturing ¯rms held
enormous stakes, with 64% of the shares in total, but as the ownership of the shares was evenly
distributed among a small number of shareholders, many of the investors not on the board also held
large stakes, and the total votes of outside blockholders was 21%. In these ¯rms, many of which
could be characterized as controlled by almost complete ownership, there was barely any separation
of ownership from control. In contrast, the management of turnpikes and banks held much smaller
stakes, and were entitled to around 20% of their ¯rms' votes. The directors of insurance ¯rms held
39% of their ¯rm's shares, and nearly half of that was due to shares held indirectly, either through
corporations (usually other insurance ¯rms) or shares held in trusts.
Although one might be tempted to interpret the high degree of insider ownership as consistent
with strong managerial incentives, and perhaps good governance, it is likely that the opposite
was true. Directors in early-nineteenth-century corporations held sweeping powers to utilize their
¯rms' resources for their own bene¯t and engage in self-dealing; bank directors, for example, were
commonly the largest borrowers from their own ¯rms.41 The comfortable margin control over the
¯rms' votes held by insiders implies that these ¯rms were operated by managers who were not
accountable to outside shareholders, and also had the authority to utilize their ¯rms' resources for
their own bene¯t.
The next section of the paper analyzes the connection between the governance provisions se-
lected in the corporate charters, and the ownership and control of the ¯rms.
3 Ownership and Governance: Empirical Analysis
Which con¯guration of voting rights was chosen for ¯rms with small shareholders? And perhaps
more importantly, what was the e®ect of di®erent voting rights on the extent of control of the
corporations by large shareholders or directors? By examining the variation in the ownership
structures and voting rights con¯gurations both between and within industries, the nature of the
relationship between the two can be better understood.
Looking across industries presents some striking contrasts. For example, if we compare the
manufacturing ¯rms to the banks and turnpike companies, clear di®erences in their ownership and
governance \styles" emerge. Manufacturing ¯rms had relatively few shareholders, the most equally
41On insider lending by banks, see Lamoreaux (1994). Rules governing self-dealing by directors ¯rst appeared in
New York's revised statues of 1829, which limited total loans to directors to one third of a ¯rm's paid-in capital
(Revised Statutes, Title 2, Article 1.)
21distributed ownership, and the greatest degree of managerial ownership. They essentially had no
small investors, and did not bother with the requirements of producing accounting statements or
mandatory dividend payments, or with graduated voting rights schemes. The shares were owned
in large blocks, and each investor had a strong incentive to monitor the performance of the ¯rm.
In contrast, banks and turnpike companies had much larger numbers of shareholders, the most
unequally distributed ownership, and the lowest degree of managerial ownership. Firms in these
industries often utilized graduated voting rights schemes, probably in an e®ort to o®er small share-
holders some protection from the power of large shareholders. And they had larger boards, perhaps
as a means to increase the representation of di®erent interests in the governance of the ¯rm.
The other major industries in the dataset, bridge companies and insurance companies, lie some-
where in between the extremes represented by manufacturing companies, on the one hand, and
banks and turnpikes, on the other. Their degree of ownership concentration and numbers of stock-
holders were certainly within the middle range of that spectrum.
These comparisons across industries suggest the the degree of ownership concentration was
negatively related to the voting rights index chosen: ¯rms in industries with unequally-distributed
shares tended to con¯gure their voting rights in a way that diminished the power of large investors.
One might imagine that these ¯rms would also o®er other governance provisions designed to better
represent or protect small investors as well. But as this regularity observed between industries
might be due to other industry characteristics, a more persuasive test of this relationship would
focus on the within-industry variation in these measures. The ownership structure and governance
institutions of the ¯rms, of course, were jointly endogenous, so the results presented below should
be interpreted as a descriptive analysis of the correlations in the data, rather than identi¯cation
of a causal relationship. But within-industry comparisons nonetheless shed important light on the
nature of the relationship between ownership structures and governance institutions.
Therefore, I analyze these relationships in the context of a regression framework, which includes
¯rm characteristics as controls, as well as industry ¯xed e®ects. The number of years a ¯rm had
existed would likely in°uence its ownership: over time, one might expect that the founders of the
¯rm, and other early investors, would gradually sell shares to new investors.42 Certainly the size
of ¯rms might a®ect these measures as well. Therefore, in what follows, I regress measures of
ownership structures on measures of governance provisions, and ¯rm size and age. Speci¯cally, for
42Field and Hanka (2001), for example, document this phenomenon among the managers of modern ¯rms that go
public.
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Regressions: Firm Ownership Structures
Regressions of charter governance provisions on measures of the distribution of ownership. All speci¯cations include ¯xed e®ects
for industries. Although 132 shareholder lists have been found, for 6 of these ¯rms, the charter was silent on the voting rights
of stockholders, so only 126 observations could be included in the regressions. The dependent variables in columns (1) through
(5) are, respectively, the percentage of the ¯rm's cash °ow rights held by the top 10% of the shareholders, the percentage of the
¯rm's votes held by the top 10% of the shareholders, the log of the total number of shareholders, the log of the total number
of New York counties within which the ¯rm's stock is owned, and the percentage of the shareholders for whom there is another
shareholder in the same corporation with the same surname. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote signi¯cance
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. A constant term (not reported) is also included.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Held by the Voting share log(Number of log(Number % w/ name
Top 10% of Top 10% Shareholders) of Counties) in common
(Mean .48; (Mean .44; (Mean 3.65; (Mean 1.28; (Mean .26;
SD .17) SD .18) SD 1.24) SD .75) SD .18)
Voting rights index (Vi) 0.065 0.321*** -0.528** -0.278* -0.078**
(0.054) (0.046) (0.241) (0.147) (0.038)
Mandatory dividend 0.124 0.148 -0.028 -0.139 -0.056
(0.135) (0.136) (0.247) (0.178) (0.052)
Annual ¯nancial statements 0.037 0.038 0.015 -0.118 -0.009
(0.042) (0.043) (0.165) (0.119) (0.044)
Number on board -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.026** 0.013*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.004) (0.001)
log(paid-in capital) -0.005 -0.014 0.113 0.192*** 0.019
(0.016) (0.014) (0.093) (0.040) (0.020)
log(¯rm age) -0.011 -0.013 0.086 0.171*** -0.000
(0.018) (0.017) (0.082) (0.046) (0.021)
Industry E®ects Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.15 0.26 0.65 0.46 0.06
Observations 126 126 126 233 126
¯rm i, I estimate the determinants of ownership measure si as
si = °0 + °1Vi + xi¯ +
P
k Ákindustryik + ui;
where Vi is the voting rights index; xi is a vector of ¯rm characteristics, including other governance
provisions; and the industryik terms are a series of six indicator variables for each industry in the
sample. A table of summary statistics for all the variable included in the regressions is included in
the data appendix.
The results for the ownership stakes and voting power of large shareholders, and measures of
the di®usion of ownership, are presented in table 5. In column (1), the degree of concentration of
ownership, measured by the percentage of the shares held by the top 10% of the investors, is the
dependent variable. Although the comparisons between industries suggest that ownership concen-
tration should be negatively correlated with the voting rights index, the results of this regression
23indicate that there was no within-industry relationship between voting rights and ownership con-
centration. This also at least suggests that graduated voting rights schemes did not cause the
distribution of shares to become more equal, and also that they did not cause widespread e®orts
by large shareholders to circumvent these schemes by holding shares in multiple names. Evidently,
investors were willing to hold stakes that were large enough to be penalized by graduated voting
rights schemes.
The results in column (2), where the voting rights (as opposed to ownership stakes) of the top
10% of shareholders is the dependent variable, therefore follow immediately: ¯rms that selected
voting rights schemes schemes that limited the power of large investors imposed them on essentially
the same distribution of ownership, resulting in much lower voting rights for the largest shareholders.
The regressions in columns (3) and (4) investigate whether lower values of the voting rights index
were associated with more di®use ownership, either in the form of a larger number of owners, or
in a wider geographical distribution of the shares. In both cases, the variation in the voting rights
index within industries does seem to be associated with somewhat greater di®usion; a one-standard-
deviation increase in the voting rights index was associated with a reduction equivalent to about
15% of a standard deviation in both the log of the number of owners, and the log of the number
of counties in which the shares were held. Note that this is consistent with small, potentially more
distant shareholders expressing a preference for investments in ¯rms with lower values of the voting
rights index, but it is also consistent with shareholders holding their stakes in multiple names when
graduated voting rights were chosen. Somewhat clearer evidence of the latter is found in column
(5), where the dependent variable is the percentage of the shareholders whose surname is the same
as that of another shareholder. If investors tried to circumvent graduated voting rights schemes by
holding their stakes in the names of others, it would have been convenient to hold them in the names
of relatives. And indeed this seems to have been the case, although the e®ect is extremely small:
the parameter estimates indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in the voting rights index
was associated with a decrease equal to 3% of a standard deviation of the degree of commonality
of the shareholders' surnames.
Interestingly, in each of the regressions for the degree of di®usion of ownership, there is a robust
association between the number of members of the board, and the degree of di®usion. Evidently
larger boards were speci¯ed for ¯rms with greater numbers of investors, and less concentrated
ownership. But perhaps in an indication of the low quality of ¯nancial reporting at the time, there
24Table 6:
Regressions: Managerial Ownership and Control
Regressions of charter governance provisions on measures of extent of managerial control. All speci¯cations include ¯xed e®ects
for industries. The dependent variables in columns (1) through (4) are, respectively, the percentage of the ¯rm's cash °ow
rights held by the board (both directly and indirectly), the percentage of the ¯rm's votes held by the board (both directly and
indirectly), the percentage of the votes controlled by holders of at least 5% of the shares who are not on the board, and the
di®erence between the voting rights of management, and the voting stake of outside 5% blockholders. Firm age is measured as
the number of years since the ¯rm received its charter. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote signi¯cance at
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. A constant term (not reported) is also included.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Held by Voting share Voting Share of Margin of
Board of Board Outside Blockholders Board Control
(Mean .42; SD .24) (Mean .39; SD .24) (Mean .07; SD .10) (Mean .33; SD .25)
Voting rights index (Vi) 0.182** 0.286*** 0.053* 0.232**
(0.081) (0.079) (0.028) (0.090)
Annual ¯nancial statements 0.014 0.043 -0.029 0.072
(0.076) (0.077) (0.029) (0.089)
Number on board -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
log(capital) -0.068 -0.052 -0.049** -0.003
(0.068) (0.067) (0.022) (0.076)
log(¯rm age) -0.032 -0.014 0.007 -0.021
(0.042) (0.042) (0.016) (0.049)
Industry E®ects Y Y Y Y
R2 0.34 0.33 0.50 0.20
Observations 51 51 51 51
was no correlation between requirements to produce ¯nancial statements annually, and the degree
of ownership di®usion.
Results for regressions estimating the relationship between governance provisions and manager-
ial ownership are presented in table 6. The sample used in these regressions is considerably smaller,
and in the remaining observations there is no within-industry variation in the use of dividend re-
quirements, so that regressor is dropped. The estimates tell a slightly di®erent story than those in
table 5: higher values of the voting rights index were associated with greater degrees of managerial
ownership, and ampli¯ed the voting power of their larger stakes. Although outside 5% blockholders
also had a larger share of the votes, the margin of managerial control was much higher for ¯rms
with higher levels of the index. Thus, even though the overall degree of ownership concentration
did not vary with the voting rights chosen, the degree of managerial ownership and control did,
and strongly: a one-standard-deviation increase in the voting rights index was associated with an
increase in managerial voting power of about 45% of a standard deviation.
254 Empirical Analysis: Firm Values
Assessing the impact of the ownership and governance data presented above for small investors or for
the performance of the ¯rms is di±cult. It is likely that the management and/or large blockholders
of some of the corporations in the dataset were essentially unaccountable to the other investors,
and the governance institutions speci¯ed in the charters of these enterprises played some part in
determining the extent of the balance of power between insiders and outsiders. But ultimately
the question of interest is: how did this balance of power a®ect the performance of the ¯rms?
The absence of any ¯nancial reports or accounting data for most of the ¯rms certainly presents
challenges for any attempt to address this question.
One avenue for investigation that is available is to analyze the market values of the publicly-
traded corporations within the sample. In 1826, the year of most of the shareholder lists in the
dataset, the shares of about 63 New York corporations were traded with some regularity on the
New York Stock and Exchange Board (NYS&EB).43 These were all shares of common stock, and
although newspapers did not report trading volumes until around 1828, contemporary accounts
suggest that the market for many corporate securities was quite liquid.44 Thus the reported price
data of these markets might reasonably be interpreted as informative of the market's assessments
of the ¯rms. Weekly prices of all equities that traded regularly on the NYS&EB were recorded
from contemporary newspapers by Sylla, Wilson and Wright (2005), and these data were matched
to the companies in the dataset.
The NYS&EB price data present at least two challenges for the researcher attempting to use
them in this way. First, although most modern research on ¯rm value uses measures of Tobin's
Q as the focus of the analysis (eg, Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988; Gompers, Ishii, Metrick, 2003),
the NYS&EB data can not be used to construct a measure of Q, as there is no data available on
the value of the ¯rms' liabilities. The prices quoted in transactions and reported in the press are
expressed as a percentage of par value, or what would have been considered the book value of the
43From time to time, a transaction involving the shares of other, more obscure New York companies' equity were
reported in the papers, but these were extremely rare and do not appear in the Sylla, Wilson and Wright (2005)
dataset. In addition, the shares of a handful of corporations from other states, especially New Jersey, were traded
regularly on the NS&EB, as was the stock of the Second Bank of the United States, and many bond issues of the
state, local, and federal governments.
44On the issuance of preferred stock by railroads in the 1840s, see Evans (1929). NYS&EB trading volumes were
¯rst reported in the New York Journal of Commerce in 1828; prior to that date many prominent New York papers
reported prices but not volumes. On the history of the New York Stock Exchange and for early trading volume data,
see Werner and Smith (1991).
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shares.45 Thus the data can be interpreted as an approximate measure of the ratio of the market
value of equity to the book value of equity.
Secondly, many shares traded infrequently. Figure 2 presents a time series plot of the prices of
four stocks of varying degrees of liquidity. Whereas for Merchants Bank and the New York Gas
Light Company, transactions are recorded in most weeks, for the Bank of New York, and to a
much greater extent for Aetna Insurance, there are many weeks or even entire months when the
shares did not trade. Nevertheless, there are distinct di®erences in the average value of these ¯rms
over the course of the year, and the empirical analysis that follows will use the annual average
values calculated from the weeks where transactions were recorded.46 But to address the problem
that some ¯rms may have recorded transactions only in particular months of more buoyant (or
perhaps more depressed) conditions in the market, the analysis will include indicator variables for
45At the time, the accounting treatment of par value was that it was equal to what would now be called contributed
capital; a ¯rm's \capital stock" was equal to the par value of its shares multiplied by the number of shares. Any
retained earnings were considered liabilities, so this notion of the capital stock was considered the book value of the
¯rm's equity.
46The relative stability of the ¯rms' values over time is consistent with the the model of Jin and Myers (2006),
which ¯nds that in opaque ¯rms with poor corporate governance and weak investor protections, insiders may absorb
¯rm-speci¯c risks through their e®orts to capture part of the value of the ¯rm. In their model insiders become the
residual claimants, and the stock held by outsiders becomes more like preferred shares.
27Table 7:
Regressions: Ownership, Governance and Firm Value
Regressions of measures of governance and managerial control on ¯rm value. The dependent variable is the mean ratio of
market value to book value for the year of 1826 (Mean 88.7; SD 24.5), computed from weekly price data. As some ¯rms did
not trade during some months of 1826, indicator variables for each month in the year within which the ¯rm's shares traded are
included in the regressions, to control for market conditions. All speci¯cations include ¯xed e®ects for industries. Standard
errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote signi¯cance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. A constant term (not reported) is
also included.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Voting rights index (Vi) -17.624**
(8.350)
Voting share of top 10% -48.163
(30.836)
Voting share of management -67.955**
(28.308)
Margin of managerial control -64.417**
(26.230)
log(paid-in capital) -5.975 -8.514 1.681 4.523
(7.028) (13.924) (11.475) (11.563)
log(¯rm age) 8.105** 11.906* 0.479 0.117
(3.241) (6.335) (6.529) (6.777)
Industry E®ects Y Y Y Y
Indicators for Months of Price Data Y Y Y Y
R2 0.40 0.49 0.68 0.69
Observations 62 41 37 37
the months of the year in which transactions were recorded.
The relationship between the ¯rms' values, and their governance provisions, is analyzed in a
simple framework that focuses on the within-industry variation. Regressions of the following form
will be estimated:




k Ákindustryik + ui;
where MBi is ¯rm i's average market-to-book ratio for 1826; Vi is the index of the ¯rm's voting
rights; xi includes ¯rm characteristics such as the size of its capital stock, and its age; the monthij
terms are a series of 12 indicator variables equal to 1 for each month of the year in which there
was at least one transaction recorded for the ¯rm's stock; and the industryik terms are a series of
6 indicators for the ¯rms' industries. In subsequent speci¯cations measures of ownership will be
substituted for the voting rights index in the regression.
The results are presented in table 7. Although the sample size is extremely small, and becomes
smaller when the ownership variables are included in the regression, some clear patterns emerge.
First, as shown in column (1), ¯rms that o®ered voting rights that limited the voting power of
28large shareholders had higher values, compared to other ¯rms in the same industry. The size of
the coe±cient indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in the voting rights index would
reduce the ¯rm's market-to-book value by 25% of a standard deviation. The reason for this simple
reduced-form relationship is suggested in columns (2)-(4), where ownership data are included in the
regression. Each of the measures is negatively related to ¯rm value, and in particular the ownership
stake of management has a strongly negative relationship with ¯rm value. This is consistent with
insiders wielding control of their corporations for their own purposes and expropriating outsiders,
and reducing the value of their ¯rms. However, it may also be due to the market's perceptions of
the quality of ¯rms' capital: if investors knew that the capital stock was paid in using stock notes or
other illiquid or risky ¯nancial instruments, this would have been re°ected in the ¯rms' valuations.
If high levels of insider ownership or high levels of the voting index were negatively correlated with
the quality of contributed capital, then this could also produce the same correlations.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The business corporation found widespread adoption in the ¯rst three decades of the nineteenth
century, as ¯rms in a range of industries received corporate charters. This paper has used data
from New York's capital tax of the 1820s to analyze the ownership and governance of many of these
early ¯rms.
One immediate conclusion that can be drawn from the results of this paper is that well before
the emergence of the large industrial enterprises with tens of thousands of shareholders described
by Berle and Means, ownership and control were quite commonly separated. In the 1820s, corpo-
rations were much smaller, and had far fewer shareholders, than the ¯rms of the late-nineteenth
century, but they su®ered from this problem nonetheless. The extent of separation of ownership
from control varied signi¯cantly across industries, and moreover what Berle and Means would call
\managerial control," where ownership is so di®use that professional, salaried managers e®ectively
hold unchecked power, was probably quite uncommon. But \minority control," where ¯rms were
operated by managers holding stakes that were large enough to make them unaccountable to the
other shareholders, was quite common. And many of the governance institutions of the ¯rms at
the time were con¯gured to help mitigate this problem.
Early-nineteenth-century ¯rms utilized a variety of means to o®er protections to their investors
and make their stock more attractive to small shareholders. Some speci¯ed graduated voting rights
29in their charters|con¯gurations of voting rights where the number of votes a stockholder was
entitled to decreased with the number of shares he owned. In response to an e®ectively punitive
voting rights structure, in which the voting power of large blockholdings was strongly reduced, large
investors did not, apparently, recon¯gure their shareholdings to a large extent, but held stakes with
severely diminished voting power. Evidently the gains attained from the protections o®ered to
small shareholders outweighed the costs. Such voting rights schemes were associated with lower
managerial ownership, and higher ¯rm values.
Another conclusion that follows from the results of this paper is that the early evolution of
the corporation was not a single process, but several processes occurring in parallel. Banks and
insurance companies, for example, attracted large amounts of capital from a broad and di®use
base of investors, and their governance institutions were con¯gured to facilitate this arrangement.
Manufacturing ¯rms, on the other hand, were quite closely held, with a few local investors holding
large stakes, and e®ectively had no \small investors" at all. Over the course of the nineteenth cen-
tury, with the rise of mass production, more integrated national markets, and other developments,
manufacturing ¯rms grew considerably in scale, and their ownership and governance evolved as
well, whereas banks and other ¯nancial corporations continued to be subject to strict limits on
their size and on the scope of their activities (see Roe, 1994).
Finally, the results of this paper suggest some important questions to be investigated in later
periods, as the corporation continued to evolve. For example, the extent of managerial ownership
of 1820s corporations was extremely high by modern standards. At what point did managerial
ownership begin to fall, and what developments were responsible for this change? Similarly, the
United States is often described as having some of the best investor protections of any country in
the world, and the least concentrated corporate ownership as a result. Certainly the level of investor
protections o®ered in the early-nineteenth century were much weaker|but how these protections
evolved across states and over time is far from clear. Answers to such questions will help place the
¯ndings of this paper in their historical context.
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34Data Appendix
The Charters
812 charters of incorporation were granted to businesses in New York prior to 1826. The 659
charters granted via special act of the legislature were found and coded from New York's session
laws (Laws of New York, 1790-1825.) A substantial fraction of these charters were subsequently
amended, often to increase the capital stock. The dataset includes the terms of the charters as
amended as of 1825. For the 153 ¯rms incorporated under New York's 1811 general incorporation
act for manufacturing ¯rms, the certi¯cates of incorporation were found in the records of the New
York State Comptroller in the New York State Archives, Albany NY (record group A1859).
New York's 1823 Capital Tax and the Shareholder Lists
In 1823, New York levied a tax on the paid-in capital of incorporated companies, payable by the
corporations themselves (Laws of New York, 1823, Ch. 262). The law was revised in 1824 and
again in 1825 in response to di±culties encountered in its implementation (Laws of New York,
1824, Ch. 22; 1825, Ch. 254.) The evolution of these laws, and the di±culties encountered in their
implementation, are discussed in the report of the comptroller on the taxation of incorporated
companies (New York Assembly Journal, 1827, p. 538-549). The law required that all incorporated
companies submit a list of the names, places of residence, and numbers of shares owned, for all
stockholders, to the state comptroller, so that revenues could be distributed to county governments
in proportion to the amount of stock owned in each county. The law remained in e®ect until 1828,
when it was replaced with a simpler capital tax on corporations that did not provide for revenue
distribution on the basis of local shareholdings (New York Revised Statutes, 1828, chapter 13, title
4).
The lists of stockholders submitted by the corporations pursuant to the tax law were found in
various di®erent record groups in the New York State Archives associated with the comptroller's
o±ce, including A0833, A0829, and A0847. The comptroller's ledgers of taxes paid by incorporated
companies pursuant to the law, and amounts allocated to the di®erent counties on the basis of the
residences of their shareholders, were found within record group A1301; the ledgers recording the
results of the comptroller's attempts to determine whether chartered corporations were in operation
were found in record group A1204. The comptroller's records indicate that compliance with the law
was initially low, but by 1826 most of the corporations believed to be in operation were submitting
the required stockholder lists. As a stockholder list could be found for at least one year for less
than half of the 282 operating corporations; this implies that most of these lists have not survived.
Although the sta® at the New York State Archives can not be certain about the reason for these
losses, they have indicated that the ¯re at the state library in 1911, coupled with the destruction
of many historical records by the state archivist in the 1950s, are the likely causes. In an e®ort
to expand the scope of the dataset, an extensive search of various archives in New York State was
undertaken to try to ¯nd duplicate copies of the stockholder lists that may have been retained by
the corporations themselves in their correspondence ¯les. A small number of these shareholder lists
found in the New York State Historical Association, Cooperstown NY, and the Citigroup Archives,
New York NY.
35Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis in the paper are presented in the table
below. Note that the statistics for the governance provisions are those pertaining to the 132
observations where ownership lists could be found.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Governance Provisions
Voting rights index (Vi) .831 .337 .001 1
Mandatory dividend .151 { 0 1
Annual ¯nancial statements .222 { 0 1
Number on board 11.793 11.443 3 92
log(paid-in capital) 11.146 1.580 6.620 14.533
log(¯rm age) 1.887 1.055 0 3.367
Ownership Structure (Table 5)
Percent of stock held by top 10% of shareholders .477 .170 .169 .962
Percent of votes held by top 10% of shareholders .437 .178 .1 .962
log(number of shareholders) 3.640 1.239 1.099 6.328
log(number of counties in which the stock is held) 1.284 .749 0 2.996
Percent of stockholders with surname in common with another .264 .174 0 1
Managerial Control (Table 6)
Percent of stock held by board (directly & indirectly) .418 .241 .062 .933
Percent of votes held by board (directly & indirectly) .395 .239 .049 .933
Percent of votes held by outside 5% blockholders .071 .010 0 .358
Margin of managerial control .324 .250 -.113 .933
Firm Value (Table 7)
Firm value (average market-to-book value for 1826) 88.756 24.515 38.254 150.855
Managerial Ownership Data
Lists of directors were found by searching all New York City and many New York State newspapers
where issues from the year 1826 survive. The newspapers in which the identities of directors were
found were the Albany Argus, New York Evening Post, New York Enquirer, New York American,
Journal of Commerce, and the New York Commercial Advertiser. In addition, city directories for
New York and Albany contained a few lists of directors. These were supplemented with lists of
directors found in the minute books of corporations held a the following institutions: Citigroup
Archives, New York NY; Oneida County Historical Society, Utica NY; SUNY Albany Library,
Albany NY; the New York State Historical Association, Cooperstown NY; and the New-York
Historical Society, New York NY.
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